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                      Abstract 
  This paper builds an overlapping generations household economy model in rural set up and 
examines the relationship between landholding and child labour in presence of 
unemployment in the manufacturing sector. We find that irrespective of whether the parents 
work in the agricultural sector as farmers or they work on own land, increase in size of land 
holding leads to decline in schooling of the child worker in the short run, and decline in 
growth rate of human capital formation in the long run but may lead to increase in the steady 
state human capital in the long run.  
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1. Introduction 
The term 'child labour' brings to our mind the picture of a child working in harsh inhuman 
conditions and we often blame the parents for such fate of their children. But in reality 
parents, in spite of being altruistic towards their children are often forced to send their 
children to work because of the grave economic situation of the family. This is what is 
termed as 'Luxury Axiom'. Many works in child labour literature may be presented as 
evidence to this phenomenon (Basu and Van 1998, Basu 1999, Emerson and Souza 2003, 
Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005, Edmonds 2005, Rickey and Jayachandran 2009).  
 
Although the general belief is that child labour is the result of poverty, many empirical papers 
challenge the view that 'Luxury Axiom' will hold true in case of agriculture as well. These 
papers derive results that contradict the 'Luxury Axiom'. Generally land is considered as a 
source of wealth for a household. So according to the 'Luxury Axiom' increase in land should 
imply addition to wealth of the household and thus should reduce the incidence of child 
labour in the family. However many recent empirical papers find contradictory results while 
studying the relationship between land holding and child labour. They find that increase in 
land holding leads to increase in child labour. This is known as 'Wealth Paradox'. According 
to this paradox, children of land rich households are more likely to work than children of land 
poor households. Since in developing countries a high percentage of child labour is engaged 
in family farming and other land related activities, the relationship between land holding and 
child labour is worth studying. Working at an early age denies the child proper schooling 
which is a major source of human capital formation of the child. However not many works 
are present that study the relationship among land holding, child labour and their human 
capital formation. Our paper seeks to conduct a theoretical study of the relationship among 
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land holding, child labour and their human capital formation at the backdrop of 
unemployment. 
 
The relationship between land holding and child labour is addressed by many empirical 
studies. Most of them find results in favour of 'Wealth Paradox'. Bhalotra and Heady (2003) 
consider two developing countries-Ghana and Pakistan for their study and they conclude 
from their study that as land holding increases in these two countries, child labour also 
increases. Boutin (2012) conducts his study using data from Mali where children help the 
elders in family farming. The study points out that as land holding of the household increases 
more children are involved in family farming as helpers. Children and adults are often used as 
substitutes in farming. However absence of hired adult labour market often propels to use the 
children in farming activities instead. Dumas (2007) shows that as land holding increases, 
more child labour will be used if the option of hiring adult labour from outside the family is 
absent. In India the existence of 'Wealth Paradox' can be traced back to the study of 
Rozenweig and Evenson (1977) who use the 1961 Census data from India to study the 
relationship between land holding and child labour. They show that as land holding increases 
value of marginal contribution of children also increases. Thus, with increase in land holding, 
children are sent to school for lesser number of hours and are instead sent to work on land. 
Moura (2009)'s study of the relationship between security of land tenure and child labour, 
based on the empirical data from Brazil, however shows that with increase in security of land 
tenure, child labour is actually be replaced by adult labour. As a result, adult labour increases 
and child labour falls. However none of these papers focus on the relationship among land 
holding, child labour and their human capital formation. 
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Only a few theoretical studies deal with the relationship among land holding and child labour. 
Basu, Das and Dutta (2007) assume that utility of the parents depends on consumption and 
child leisure and parents decide how much time the child will devote to work and how much 
time the child will enjoy leisure. Their theoretical model shows an inverted U shaped 
relationship between land holding and child labour. When this result is tested empirically 
using data from India, it is found that as land holding increases beyond 3.6 acres, child labour 
starts falling although initially with increase in land holding child labour increases. Bar and 
Basu(2008) show that when land holding increases by a small amount child labour increases 
not only in the short run but also in the long run. However as size of land holding exceeds a 
particular level child labour starts falling in the long run. However in both these papers 
education of child labour is not accommodated for.  Chakraborty and Chakraborty (2014) 
incorporate education of child labour in their theoretical paper on landholding, child labour 
and human capital formation. This paper concludes that as land holding increases child labour 
increases in the short run. However in the long run, steady state human capital and growth 
rate of human capital bear a U-shaped relation with size of land holding. However this paper 
assumes that adults work only in manufacturing sector and children are sent to work on land 
only. This paper tries to extend Chakraborty and Chakraborty (2014) model to a situation 
where both parents and children work on land.  
 
 
Since intergenerational persistence of child labour is quite common in real world we  
consider an overlapping generations model to capture this dynamic aspect of child labour. 
This allows us to discuss the issue of child labour from both short run as well long run 
perspective. This paper also includes expected earnings from child in parental utility function 
and studies the relationship among landholding, child labour and human capital at the 
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backdrop of unemployment. Mukherjee and Sinha (2006), in their paper on child labour, 
include expected earnings from child in parental utility function in the presence of 
unemployment in formal sector. But their paper is not modelled in a dynamic setting. 
 
 
This paper builds an overlapping generations model of household economy in rural set up. 
The economy consists of a manufacturing sector and an agricultural sector. If one individual 
is employed in manufacturing sector she gets wage proportional to human capital whereas 
agricultural sector gives a fixed return. Expected future earning of child is included in the 
parental utility function and parental choice of schooling vis-a-vis child work is considered. 
Since overwhelming portion of child labours work in agricultural sector we consider the 
problem of parental choice of schooling for a farmer household. A farmer might own the 
farmed land or might work as a labourer on land owned by others.  In advanced economies, a 
farmer is usually a farm owner, while in developing countries they are mere employees of the 
farm owned by someone else and are known as farm workers. In this paper, first we consider 
the case where adult and child of a household work in agricultural sector as farm workers and 
they get competitive wages. Next we consider the case where both adult and child work on 
household owned land. This paper attempts to understand the relationship among land size, 
child labour and human capital development in both the cases.  This paper considers parental 
choice of schooling vis-a-vis child work to understand the relationship among land size, child 
labour and human capital development, in the short run and the long run. We find that though 
an increase in land size reduces child schooling and increases child labour in short run and 
reduces growth rate in the long run, it may increase steady state human capital in the long 
run. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model, section 3 
discusses the case where parents work in agricultural sector as farmer, section 4 discusses the 
case where parents work on household owned land, section 5 presents the major findings and 
propositions obtained from the analysis of the two cases discussed in this paper. Concluding 
remarks are made in section 6. 
 
2. The Model 
We consider an economy that consists of identical households in overlapping generations 
framework2. Each household consists of one adult and one child. We consider two parents as 
one adult and two children as one child. Following Glomm (1997) and Chakraborty and 
Chakraborty (2014), we assume parental choice of human capital investment. The adult 
decides the time allocation of the child between work and schooling. Utility function of the 
adult depends on family consumption and expected earnings of the child in future3. When the 
child becomes adult he may not get opportunity to work as skilled labour in manufacturing 
sector due to job uncertainty in the manufacturing sector in presence of unemployment. If she 
does not get job in manufacturing sector she gets absorbed in the agricultural sector. Adult 
forms expectations over whether she believes that the child will get job in manufacturing 
sector on becoming adult4. This forecasting depends on present level of unemployment in the 
economy.  
                                                           
2 Other papers which use overlapping generations frame work include Becker and Tomes (1979), Acemoglu and Pischke 
(2000), Glomm (1997), Glomm and Ravikumar (1998), Chakraborty and Chakraborty (2014). 
 
3 In Mukherjee and Sinha (2006), child’s future earning enters the parent’s utility function.  According to Genicot and Ray 
(2010), people’s incentive to invest depends on their aspirations for their future well beings (or that of their off springs). 
Utility of parent depends on expectations of the parents from their children. 
 
4
 In Emerson and Knabb (2007), households form expectations over whether they believe the government will keep its 
promise to implement the social security program that will help to eradicate child labour. In Chakraborty and Chakraborty 
(2014) adults form expectations whether their children will get job in manufacturing sector in future. 
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Human capital formation of the child depends on the time devoted to schooling by the child 
and human capital of the parent. 
Like Moav (2005), this paper assumes that human capital evolution is independent of 
physical capital.  
 
Human capital accumulation function of a child is assumed to take the following form5: 
ht+1 = bstht+ h,                                                                                                             (1)      
   
where ‘st’ is the time devoted to studies by the child, and ‘ht’ represents the level of human 
capital possessed by the adult; b>0 is a positive constant and h	represents the minimum level 
of human capital achieved by a child even if she does not attend school( i.e. st=0).Thus ht+1>0 
even if st =0. 
 
 We consider two cases.  
 
3. Case 1: Parents work in agricultural sector as farmers 
In first case we consider an economy that consists of two sectors- a manufacturing sector and 
an agricultural sector. If one individual is employed in manufacturing sector she gets wage 
proportional to human capital whereas agricultural sector gives a return which is equal to the 
value of marginal productivity of labour. The child, if she works, will be employed only as 
agricultural worker. We discuss the case where parents work in agricultural sector as farmers. 
                                                           
5
 Following Wahba (2005), Oreopoulos,Page and Stevens(2003),Ray (2000),Khan (2003),Emerson and Souza(2003), 
Contreras (2008), Emerson and Knabb (2006) and Galor and Tsiddon (1997)we assume that parental human capital is a 
major determinant of human capital formation of child.  
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The adult sends her child to school for ‘st’ units of time and for the remaining ‘(1- st)’ units of 
time, the child is employed in the agricultural sector. Wages earned by the adult and by the 
child constitute the total income of the household. If the child joins the manufacturing sector, 
on becoming adult, she gets a wage which is a fixed proportion of the human capital 
possessed by her (δht+1)6. In agricultural sector the adult gets a wage which is equal to the 
value of her marginal productivity. We assume that the production function in the agricultural 
sector is given by Y	= AL	T			where Yat is the agricultural output, A is the technological 
index of the agricultural sector, T is the size of land holding used for agricultural production 
and L is the labour employed in the agricultural sector. Thus wage of the adult is given by P 
A(1-α)L	T	  where P  is the price of the agricultural good. Children, by working in the 
agricultural sector get a fixed proportion of the competitive wage received by adults, which is 
less than the return obtained by the adults from agricultural sector.  
 
When adult works in the agricultural sector as farmer they are paid marginal productivity of 
labour as their wage. In this case, household income is given by: 
 
Yt =P A(1-α)L	T	 {1+θ(1-st )} ,                                                                              (2)          
where Yt is total income of the household, P A(1-α)L	T	 is the wage earned by the adult in 
agricultural sector and θ is the fraction of adult wage that a child labour receives. Here 0< θ 
<1 is a positive constant. 
 
The household spends its income on purchasing consumption good only. So, the budget 
constraint of the household is given by: 
                                                           
6
 Hare and Ulph (1979) assume that ability and amount of education received by an individual are the major determinants 
of wage rate of an individual. 
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P A(1-α)L	T	 {1+θ(1-st )} = pcct ,                                                                                                                  (3)                                                      
where pc is the price of the consumption good and pcct represents the total consumption 
expenditure. 
 
When adults work in manufacturing sector, household income is given by: 
 
Yt = wt +P A (1-α)L	T	 θ (1-st )  ,                                                                                                         
where wt is the wage earned by the adult in the manufacturing sector. We assume wage 
earned in manufacturing sector (wt) is proportional to the human capital acquired by that 
individual i.e. wt= δht. 
 
Utility function of an adult of the representative household is defined as follows: 
 
Ut = β ln (ct ) +(1- β) ln [f δ(bstht +h  ) + (1-f)	P A(1-α)L	T	] ,                                (4)                                          
where ct represents consumption. Adult believes that the probability of the child getting job in 
manufacturing sector is f (present employment rate of manufacturing sector), δ (bstht +h ) is 
the return that the child may get as an adult if he gets job in the manufacturing sector, adult 
believes that the probability of the child not getting job in manufacturing sector is (1-f).While 
modelling parental expectation, adaptive expectation is assumed. Parents observe present 
unemployment rate and expect that the same unemployment rate would prevail. So they 
believe that their children will get employed in manufacturing sector with probability f if the 
employment rate of manufacturing sector is f and rate of unemployment in manufacturing 
sector would be (1-f). It is assumed that whoever does not get job in manufacturing sector 
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gets employed in agricultural sector. Agricultural sector absorbs all the residual labour force. 
So there is no possibility of remaining fully unemployed.	P A(1-α)L	T	 is the return that 
the child may get as an adult if he gets job in agricultural sector. [f δ(bstht +h ) + (1-f)	P A(1-
α)L	T	] represents total expected earning of child.  
 
Let us first apply the model in the short-run equilibrium context for the case where adults 
work in agricultural sector as farmers and understand the relationship between land size and 
schooling. 
 
Short-run equilibrium when adults work in agricultural sector as farmers 
Utility maximization problem of an adult of the representative household is to maximize the 
utility, given by equation (4), subject to budget constraint given by equation (3) with respect 
to the decision variables of the household, viz, ct and st. 
 
 From the first order conditions7of the above optimization problem, we obtain: 
st =     
()()[	()	(	)]

                                                                                           
(5)
               
 
Now st =1 when ht ≥   
[	()	(	)]
[()]  
    = h 
Lower is the value of	h  higher is the chance that ht ≥h. 
The condition for positive schooling is ht≥ 
[	()	(	)]
()()
  = h .  
                                                           
7
 For detailed derivation please see equations (A.1.1) and (A.1.2) of Appendix 1. 
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Differentiating
 
equation
 
(5) with respect to T gives 
  
!"
!
= - 


 [(1-f) P	A(1 − α)L	αT	] < 0 
This implies that as land holding increases, time devoted to schooling by the child decreases. 
 
Dynamics of human capital formation when adults work in agricultural sector as 
farmers 
Using equations (1) and (5) we have: 
 
ht+1 = 		
	(β)fδbht(1+θ)−βθ{fδh+	(1−f)Pa	A(1−α)L
−αTα]

			 + h                                                                            (6)       
                                                                           
 
Differentiating ht+1 with respect to ht we have 
 
!01
!
    
= 
   
(β)()

   > 0                                                                                                                                            (7) 
 
This implies that parents having higher level of human capital are more likely to have 
children with higher human capital. Studies done by Ray (2000), Rickey and Jayachandran 
(2009), Akabayashi and Psacharapoulos (1999), Ravallion and Wodon (1999), Ray and 
Lancaster (2004), Chakraborty and Chakraborty (2014) – support this finding. 
 
If !01
!
 >1, then no equilibrium exists. So we assume !01
!
 < 1 in our model. 
The relationship between ht and his shown in Figure 1 
 
  
Figure 1: Relationship between parental human capital and human capital of children
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Let the steady state level of h be	h∗. At steady state, ht= ht+1. Then, from equation (6), the 
steady state level of human capital is given by:    
 
h∗=
3fδh+	(1−f)Pa	A(1−α)L
−αTα4−fδθh
()fδb(1+θ)−fδθ
	                                                                                                                       (8)      
 
 Differentiating h∗with respect to T we get, 	
 
!∗
!
 = 
(1−f)Pa	A(1−α)L
−ααTα−1
()fδb(1+θ)−fδθ
 
 
!∗
!
 >0 if (1-β)fδb(1+θ)-fδθ > 0 or (1-β)b(1+θ) - θ > 0 
Let us now study the effect of increase in land size on growth rate of human capital.  
Let the growth rate of human capital			ht+1−ht
ht
 be denoted by φ. Then, 
 
  φ =
01

	 = 
()()3fδh+	(1−f)Pa	A(1−α)L
−αTα4

	 + 
ht
 -1 
 
Differentiating φ with respect to T we get,  
 
!5
!
= 
(1−f)Pa	A(1−α)L
−ααTα−1

 < 0 
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4. Case 2: Parents work on own land 
In this section we discuss the case where both parents and children work on land owned by 
the household themselves. On becoming adult, children may join manufacturing sector if they 
get job in that sector. If they do not get job in manufacturing sector they keep on working on 
own land with their parents. The adult sends her child to school for ‘st’ units of time and for 
the remaining ‘(1- st)’ units of time, the child is employed in the household owned land. 
Revenue earned by selling the agricultural produce in the market constitutes the total income 
of the household. If the child joins the manufacturing sector, on becoming adult, she gets a 
wage which is a fixed proportion of the human capital possessed by her (δht+1). We assume 
that the production function 8  in the agricultural sector is given by Y	= A {1 + θ(1 −
s)}T			where Yat is the agricultural output, A is the technological index of the agricultural 
sector, T is the land used for agricultural production and θ is the adult equivalent scaling. 
Total return from land is given by P  A {1 + θ(1 − s)}T	  where P  is the price of the 
agricultural good.  
 
When adult works on household owned land household income is given by: 
Yt =PA{1 + θ(1 − s)}T	,                                                                                           (9)          
where Yt is total income of the household. Here 0< θ <1 is a positive constant. 
The household spends its income on purchasing consumption good only. So, the budget 
constraint of the household is given by: 
PA{1 + θ(1 − s)}T	= pcct ,                                                                                                                                    (10)                                                    
                                                           
8
 Note that we consider a production function that is different from Case 1 considered in section 3. This is done only for the 
sake of technical simplicity. 
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where pc is the price of the consumption good and pcct represents the total consumption 
expenditure. 
Utility function of an adult of the representative household is defined as follows: 
Ut = β ln (ct ) +(1- β) ln [f δ(bstht +h  ) + (1-f)	P AT	] ,                                                 (11)                                          
where ct represents family consumption. Adult believes that the probability of the child 
getting job in manufacturing sector is f (present employment rate of manufacturing sector), δ 
(bstht +h ) is the return that the child may get as an adult if he gets job in the manufacturing 
sector, adult believes that the probability of the child not getting job in manufacturing sector 
is (1-f).While modelling parental expectation, adaptive expectation is assumed. Parents 
observe present unemployment rate and expect that the same unemployment rate would 
prevail. So they believe that their children will get employed in manufacturing sector with 
probability f if the employment rate of manufacturing sector is f and rate of unemployment in 
manufacturing sector would be (1-f). It is assumed that whoever does not get job in 
manufacturing sector gets employed on household owned land. Household land absorbs all 
the residual labour force. So there is no possibility of remaining fully unemployed.	P AT	 is 
the return that the child may get as an adult if he works on household owned land. [f δ(bstht 
+h ) + (1-f)	P AT	] represents total expected earning of child.  
Let us now apply the model in the short-run equilibrium context for the case where adults 
work on own land and understand the relationship between land size and schooling. 
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Short-run equilibrium when adults work on household owned land 
Utility maximization problem of an adult of the representative household is to maximize the 
utility, given by equation (11), subject to budget constraint given by equation (10) with 
respect to the decision variables of the household, viz, ct and st. 
 
 From the first order conditions9of the above optimization problem, we obtain: 
st =     
()()[	()	]

                                                                                                                    
(12)
               
 
Now st =1 when ht ≥   
[	()	]
[()]  
    = h 
Lower is the value of	h  higher is the chance that ht ≥h. 
The condition for positive schooling is ht≥ 
[	()	]
()()
  = h .  
Differentiating
 
equation
 
(12) with respect to T gives 
  
!"
!
= - 


 [(1-f) P	AαT	] < 0 
This implies that as land holding increases, time devoted to schooling by the child decreases. 
 
Dynamics of human capital formation when adults work on own land 
Using equations (1) and (12) we have: 
 
ht+1= 		
	(β)fδbht(1+θ)−βθ{fδh+	(1−f)Pa	AT
α]

			 + h                                                                                              (13)       
                                                           
9
 For detailed derivation please see equations (A.2.1) and (A.2.2) of Appendix 2. 
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Differentiating ht+1 with respect to ht we have 
 
!01
!
    
= 
   
(β)()

   > 0                                                                                                                                           (14) 
 
 
This implies that parents having higher level of human capital are more likely to have 
children with higher human capital.  
 
If 
!01
!
 >1, then no equilibrium exists. So we assume !01
!
 < 1 in our model. 
 
The figure showing the relationship between ht and hwill be identical to Figure 1. 
 
Let the steady state level of h be	h∗. At steady state, ht= ht+1. Then, from equation (6), the 
steady state level of human capital is given by:    
 
h∗=
3fδh+	(1−f)Pa	AT
α4−fδθh
()fδb(1+θ)−fδθ
	                                                                                                                                            (15)      
 
 Differentiating h∗with respect to T we get, 	
 
!∗
!
 = 
(1−f)Pa	AαT
α−1
()fδb(1+θ)−fδθ
 
 
!∗
!
 >0 if (1-β)fδb(1+θ)-fδθ > 0 or (1-β)b(1+θ) - θ > 0 
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Let us now study the effect of increase in land size on growth rate of human capital. 
Let the growth rate of human capital		01

 be denoted by φ. Then, 
 
  φ =
01

	 = 
()()3fδh+	(1−f)Pa	AT
α4

	 + 
ht
 -1 
 
Differentiating φ with respect to T we get,  
 
!5
!
= 
(1−f)Pa	AαT
α−1

 < 0 
 
5. Major findings and Propositions 
Analysis of the above two cases helps us to reach the major findings and propositions of this 
paper. 
 
Irrespective of whether the parents work in agricultural sector as farmer or they work on 
household land there exists a particular level of parental human capital beyond which parents 
send their children for full schooling. The children having parents with above this critical 
level of human capital will not work as child labour. There also exists a particular level of 
human capital below which schooling of child becomes zero. So for sending children to 
school parents need minimum level of human capital. 
 
Proposition 1: If initial human capital is higher than	h  there will be no child labour and if 
initial human capital is less than h0 there will be no schooling of child.  
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As size of landholding increases time devoted to schooling by the child decreases in the short 
run irrespective of whether the parents work in agricultural sector as farmers or they work on 
own land. 
 
Proposition 2: In the short run equilibrium, increase in the size of land holding decreases 
school attendance of child (increases child labour). 
 
As the land size increases, marginal productivity of child labour goes up. Hence, in the short 
run, as size of land holding increases parents are motivated to send their children to work  for 
higher number of hours and curtail the time children devote to schooling. This result tallies 
with the results of existing literature e.g. Bhalotra and Heady (2003), Bar and Basu (2008), 
Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977), Dumas (2007), Chakraborty and Chakraborty (2014) etc., 
and contradicts the finding of Moura (2009). 
 
If (1- β) is high i.e. parental altruism is high, b is high i.e. educational technology is highly 
efficient and θ is low i.e. the fraction of adult wage that a child labour receives is low, there is 
higher possibility of the steady state human capital to increase in response to increase in size 
of land holding. This will hold true when parents work in agricultural sector as farmer or they 
work on own land. With increase in household land size, parents send their children to school 
for lesser number of hours due to increase in marginal return from farm work, but at the same 
time parental altruism factor propels parents to send their children to school for higher 
number of hours. If the parental altruism factor dominates then steady state human capital 
may increase with increase in land holding. Similarly if educational technology is highly 
efficient, then in spite of attending school for lesser number of hours, steady state human 
capital may increase. Moreover if the fraction of adult wage that a child labour receives by 
20 
 
working on land is low, parents feel less motivated to send their children to work on land. In 
this case, due to increase in landholding, although marginal return from farm work increases, 
steady state human capital may increase.   
 
Proposition 3: If parental altruism is high, educational technology is highly efficient and the 
fraction of adult wage that a child labour receives is low, there is higher possibility of the 
steady state human capital to increase in response to increase in land holding no matter the 
adults work as hired farmers or they work on their own land. 
 
As landholding increases, growth rate falls irrespective of whether the parents work in 
agricultural sector as farmers or work on household owned land. An increase in land size 
leads the adult to send her child to work on household land for extended units of time rather 
than sending the child to school. Time devoted to schooling keeps on decreasing with 
increase in land size, due to the enhanced marginal return from child work compared to 
schooling at margin. Consequently, human capital formation of the child gets affected as the 
hours of schooling falls, and the growth rate of human capital decreases. 
 
Proposition 4: Given ht, there is a negative relationship between the growth rate of human 
capital and the size of land holding. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
This paper builds an overlapping generations household economy model in a rural set up and 
examines the impact of an increase in the size of landholding on school attendance by the child 
labourer, and the child’s human capital formation and growth at the backdrop of unemployment. 
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In this model, each household consists of one adult and one child. We consider two cases. In the 
first case the adult is employed in the agricultural sector as a hired farmer. The child, on 
becoming adult may join the manufacturing sector or agricultural sector. If the child joins the 
manufacturing sector on becoming adult, she earns a wage proportional to her human capital 
while in the agricultural sector she earns a return equivalent to the value of her marginal 
productivity, as an adult. In the second case the adult works on own land. The child, on 
becoming adult may join the manufacturing sector or continue work on land. If the child joins 
the manufacturing sector on becoming adult, she earns a wage proportional to her human 
capital while in the agricultural sector she earns a fixed return. The adult derives satisfaction 
from household consumption and expected earning of child. She forms expectations over 
whether she believes that the child will get employment in the manufacturing sector in the 
future. Human capital accumulation of the child depends on the time devoted to schooling by 
the child and human capital of the parent. The adult maximizes her utility by making 
decisions about consumption and time allocation of child between schooling and work. We 
obtain some interesting results. We find that an increase in land size leads to a decline in 
schooling of the child worker in the short run and growth rate of human capital in the long run. 
However in the long run, steady state human capital may increase in response to increase in 
landholding. We also find that parents possessing higher levels of human capital are more likely 
to send their children to school. All these results hold true, irrespective of whether the adult 
works in agricultural sector as farmer or works on own land.  
 
Barring some rare instances, parents generally have to bear some cost to educate their 
children. However in this paper we assume that schooling does not involve any cost attached 
to it. However inclusion of education expenditure on part of the parents can affect the results 
of our paper significantly. Moreover we assume the unemployment rate to be exogenous in 
22 
 
our model. Assuming the unemployment rate to be endogenous can also have significant 
impact on the findings of this paper. This is because possibility of unemployment of child in 
the future is strongly related to her schooling in childhood. In spite of parental altruism child 
labour is often present due to poverty of the household. Existence of credit markets helps the 
household to overcome such a situation and lowers the incidence of child labour. We do not 
consider the existence of credit market in our model. All these may be considered for future 
research.  
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     Appendix 1 
When parents work in the agricultural sector as farmers the optimization problem of the 
household is to maximize 
Z= β
 
lnct + (1-β) ln [fδ(bstht +h) + (1-f)	P A(1-α)L	T	] + λ [P A(1-α)L	T	 {1+θ(1-st )} - 
pc ct] 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The decision variables of the household are ct and st .The 
first order conditions for maximization of utility are given by:  
 
8
9
	=	

9	
 - λpc =0                                                                                                        (A.1.1) 
 
8
"
 = 
()
("			)			()	(	)	
 – λP A(1-α)L	T	 θ=0                              (A.1.2)                                   
 From (A.1.1) and budget constraint	P A(1-α)L	T	 {1+θ(1-st )}= pc ct , we get 

			(	)	{("	)}
  = λ                                                                                  (A.1.3)                                                                                                      
From (A.1.2) and using (A.1.3) we get, 
st  =  
()()[	()	(	)]

                                                       (A.1.4) 
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        Appendix 2 
When parents work on household owned land the optimization problem of the household is to 
maximize 
Z= β
 
lnct + (1-β) ln [fδ(bstht +h) + (1-f)	P AT	] + λ [P AT	 {1+θ(1-st )} - pc ct] 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The decision variables of the household are ct and st .The 
first order conditions for maximization of utility are given by:  
 
8
9
	=	

9	
 - λpc =0                                                                                                        (A.2.1) 
 
8
"
 = 
()
("			)			()		
 – λP AT	 θ=0                                                         (A.2.2)                                   
 From (A.2.1) and budget constraint	P AT	 {1+θ(1-st )}= pc ct , we get 

				{("	)}
  = λ                                                                                               (A.2.3)                                                                                                      
From (A.2.2) and using (A.2.3) we get, 
st =  
()()[	()	]

                                                                     (A.2.4) 
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